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Abstract
This paper argues that free will is a purely theological issue, and
offers an error theory for the free will debates in analytic philosophy
in terms of evolutionary naturalism. I introduce ‘protean free will’
(PFW) as the ability to play mixed strategies effectively in noncoop-
erative interactions. Thence, I argue that traditional worries about
divine foreknowledge, Frankfurt controllers, moral responsibility, and
determinism are side effects of selective pressures for unpredictability
in our evolutionary past. Finally, I interpret the Libet experiments as
showing an adaptive response to such pressures. I conclude that PFW
does most things most philosophers want free will to do, conditional
on the nonexistence of God.
1 Introduction
Free will is a perfectly meaningful metaphysical property in theology. It
can be invoked, for instance, to address the apparent quandary posed by a
God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent allowing people to
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suffer and condemning some souls to eternal damnation (e.g. Lewis, 1940).
There are a number of ways free will could exist in this context, and so it is
potentially worthwhile and productive for theological philosophers to debate
the existence and meaning of free will. After the progress in theology in the
last half-century, though, free will is no longer a particularly compelling issue
in most theological circles.
Yet free will as an issue of debate has enjoyed a resurrection in recent
decades among philosophers working in the analytic tradition. Unsurpris-
ingly, these philosophers have made little meaningful progress. For like
young-earth creationists studying paleontology, they have thrown out the
Baby and are perplexed by the bathwater that remains.
If free will is properly a theological concept, then it may be meaningfully
approached in either of two ways: theologically, according to the methods
of that discipline; or naturalistically, as Barrett (2000) and Dennett (2006)
approach the more basic theological concepts. I offer a naturalistic account
of free will and the free will debate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines Protean Free Will
(PFW). Section 3 compares the relationship between free will and divine
foreknowledge to that between PFW and Frankfurt controllers. Section 4
shows how the sort of alternative possibilities entailed by PFW support moral
responsibility. Section 5 discusses the implications of determinism and in-
determinism for PFW. Section 6 derives the physiological requirements for
PFW, and Section 7 offers an interpretation of the Libet experiments which
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shows how these requirements might be met by the human brain and mind.
Section 8 compares PFW with other compatibilist notions of free will, and
some incompatibilist ones too. Section 9 concludes.
2 Protean Free Will
Consider an agent who faces an environment which includes sophisticated
other agents with interests contrary to hers. Call the agent Mary, and call
the other agents predators. One good way for Mary to avoid exploitation
by predators, exploitation which may include death, is to engage in protean
behavior (Chance and Russell, 1959). That is, she may behave somewhat
erratically so as to be unpredictable. As documented by Miller (1997), the
protean strategy offers many clear advantages over the alternatives of con-
cealment of intentions and active deception. While most notions of ‘reason’
prescribe a single optimal action in any situation,1 Mary’s behavior must
sometimes be locally sub-optimal for the sake of unpredictability.
1Descartes (2008/1641, Meditation IV, p. 58): “if I always clearly saw what is true
and good, I would never need to deliberate about a judgment to be made or a course of
action to be chosen; and in that case, although I would be fully free, I could never be
indifferent.”
Locke (1985/1689, II/XXI: Sec. 48): “A perfect Indifferency in the Mind, not determinable
by its last judgment of the Good or Evil, that is thought to attend its Choice, would be
so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be
as great an imperfection, as the want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, ill determined
by the Will, would be an imperfection on the other side.”
Kant (1956/1788, p. 31): “The practical rule, which is thus here a law, absolutely and
directly determines the will objectively, for pure reason, practical in itself, is here directly
legislative.”
Samuelson (1947, p. 111): “[The demand functions] must be single-valued; i.e., to each
set of prices and income there corresponds a unique set of goods.”
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Such local sub-optimality means that at some times t, there are multiple
courses of action At available which are tied for the strategic optimum. Call
the set of such courses of action Mary’s strategy St. For the purpose of
this discussion, no generality is lost in assuming that the optimal probability
distribution over St is uniform, so that each At is equiprobable. Furthermore,
while St is defined from a bird’s-eye view, we may assume that Mary has
evolved some reasonably good mechanism for approximating it in the real
world. The elements of St depend on Mary’s preferences, of course, but
the strategic optimality of each course of action also includes the risk of
exploitation by predators. This, in turn, depends on Mary’s past actions and
predators’ resulting guesses about her next action. If Mary and her predators
both use optimal mixed strategies (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944),
each At should be equally optimal for Mary, and there should be no advantage
to a representative predator of predicting that Mary will perform any given
At ∈ St rather than any other A′t ∈ St. However, if a predator knew or
reasonably suspected at time r, r < t, that Mary were going to perform A∗t
at time t, the predator could exploit this knowledge. A∗t would therefore no
longer be optimal for Mary, and would therefore not be an element of St
when time t arrived. Call the ability to select an A∗t from St and perform it
such that A∗t is still in St at time t ‘protean free will’ (PFW).
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3 Divine Foreknowledge
God’s omniscience has long been seen as a potential impediment to free will.
Augustine caricatured a naive form of the argument in his De libero arbitrio
(presented in quotes in the text):
“If God has foreknowledge of my future will, then I am necessi-
tated to will what He has foreknown, since nothing can happen
differently than God has foreknown it. But if I am necessitated,
we must admit that I no longer will freely, but of necessity.”
[III:3(8)]
While Augustine called this argument “sheer folly,” it has nonetheless
held sway over many people through the centuries (see Zabzebski, 2002, for
a review of historical and contemporary views on divine foreknowledge and
free will). PFW provides a naturalistic account of such sway, even under the
assumption that God does not exist.
Let us suppose that Barrett (2000) is correct in asserting that widespread
belief in God is a spandrel; the yield of a “Hyperactive Agent Detection
Device” which conferred a fitness advantage upon our evolutionary ancestors.
If such an account is correct, we should expect people to feel toward God
the same sorts of feelings they feel toward other agents, including predators.
As such, we might expect Mary to worry about God knowing what she is
about to do, whether or not she explicitly believes in God. For, if belief in
God is an evolved disposition, then its attendant worries and comforts ought
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to be difficult to shake, as are the appeals of fat, sugar, and scantily clad
conspecifics of the opposite sex. The nonexistence of God, though, means
that Mary’s PFW is safe from divine foreknowledge, worry though she may.
Harry Frankfurt (1969) introduced a controller who would force an agent
to perform some action if and only if the agent was not going to do that action
anyway.2 Frankfurt never suggested that such controllers actually exist, and
in fact allowed that the controller could be replaced by a machine or even
natural forces (p. 836n). In contrast, PFW, defined as the ability to confound
predators, depends critically on the sophistication of the actual predators in
an agent’s environment. For Mary, the hypothetical possibility of Frankfurt
controllers is irrelevant; the important thing is their empirical absence. Thus,
an agent worried about Frankfurt controllers should want PFW, in the same
way that those who have traditionally worried about divine foreknowledge
have wanted free will.
4 Moral Responsibility
Kant held that moral responsibility requires transcendental freedom: “With-
out this freedom...no moral law and no moral imputation are possible” (Kant,
1956/1788, p. 227). Parfit (2011) argues that Kant is confusing determinism
with fatalism, and that morality requires only the sort of freedom which uses
‘could’ in the hypothetical, motivational sense (pp. 262-3). Here, as through-
2His point was that moral responsibility does not seem to require alternative possibili-
ties.
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out his book, Parfit conflates moral responsibility with moral accountabil-
ity, the difference being that accountability requires interaction with other
agents (Pereboom, 2001). This is understandable, since without recourse to
a supreme arbiter (i.e. God), moral accountability is not practically differ-
ent from moral responsibility. Thence, one of the primary questions facing
an atheist moral philosopher like Parfit is the extent to which we can le-
gitimately hold others accountable for their actions, where holding others
accountable is the same as holding them responsible.
The sorts of actions for which we wish to hold others responsible tend to
be those which harm us or others, particularly when they benefit the actor;
i.e. pure coercive transfers in Judge Posner’s typology (Posner, 1985). The
victim, or a third-party observer, of a pure coercive transfer may want to
hold the perpetrator responsible, and experience shows that it is easier to
hold others responsible for acts which we do not anticipate. For our purposes,
anyone who would hold Mary responsible for her actions is a predator. While
PFW may help Mary by allowing her to complete a pure coercive transfer
without being thwarted by such predators, the unpredictability it entails also
makes it easier for them to hold her responsible for it.
Suppose Mary’s action A∗t at time t is a pure coercive transfer. If Mary
has PFW, then from the point of view of anyone but God, she did have
genuine alternative possibilities available to her at some time t: these were
the elements, or potential elements, of St. As far as anyone can tell, she
‘could have done otherwise’ than to select and perform A∗t . Her selection of
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a particular action may have been random, but it was her preferences which
posed it for consideration and her randomness which ultimately selected it.
Many libertarians in the free will debate agree with Bob Kane’s asser-
tion that free will requires ‘ultimate responsibility,’ which entails alternative
possibilities (Kane, 1996, p. 33). In Kane’s libertarianism, free will is ex-
erted in self-forming actions (SFAs) by an agent confronted with multiple
possibilities for which she has good reasons (Kane, 1996, p. 75). In practice,
choosing A∗t from a non-trivial St could meet all the criteria for an SFA.
Mary had reasons, which were as much hers as anything, for each element of
St. Nothing in the definition of PFW precludes the selection of a particular
A∗t from changing Mary’s preferences or otherwise biasing her future behav-
ior. Whether or not the world is deterministic, if the criteria for PFW are
met then there is nobody around to notice the difference. Thus, PFW offers
libertarians like Kane something akin to what they ask of free will.
5 Determinism and Indeterminism
Protean free will turns out to be possible whether or not determinism holds,
but differently so in each case.
Suppose the world is not deterministic. Suppose Mary’s brain is occasion-
ally subject to ‘Lucretian swerves,’ ripples in the fabric of causation which
cause some of her actions to be genuinely random. If the randomness is sub-
ject to Mary’s control, then this is sufficient for PFW: Whenever the need
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arises, she can define the set St, and then use her randomizing device to select
an A∗t at the very moment she is about to act. Since the selection is both
truly random and made at the moment of action, it would be theoretically
impossible for a predator to learn A∗t at any time prior to t. Furthermore, as
A∗t is selected from St at time t, A
∗
t will always be in St at time t. Therefore,
this strong form of indeterminism is sufficient for PFW. However, we have
no reason to believe that the world or the brain actually works this way.
Now, suppose the world is not deterministic, and Mary’s brain is subject
to occasional Lucretian swerves, but Mary has no control over when they
happen or exactly what effects they have. This might be the case if the
physical activity in Mary’s brain were affected by quantum events. Therefore,
her act of defining the set St is sometimes subject to random errors, as is
her selection of an A∗t to perform. If the swerves were frequent and severe,
they would render Mary’s brain nearly useless. At the other extreme, if the
swerves were very subtle, their effects could be eliminated by rate coding (cf.
London et al., 2010). This would leave Mary’s brain effectively deterministic.
So, suppose Mary’s brain is subject to some degree of purely random
noise which does not debilitatingly interfere with her mental functioning,
but which makes her behavior somewhat stochastic. Specifically, suppose
that Mary has at least a minimal understanding of the sorts of effects that
randomness has on her behavior. Now Mary can deal with this uncertainty
in the same way that she deals with uncertainty about events outside of her
body, whatever that way happens to be. Thus, this level of randomness does
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not impede her ability to define St. If, at time t, a random event causes her
to select some action Bt which is not in St, that is unfortunate. However,
the fact that she did not in fact select an action in St does not mean that
she did not have the ability to do so at time t. There is no reason to think
she did not have this ability. A random event just caused her not to do so.3
Most importantly, at this level of impact, the randomness in her brain may
have strategic value to Mary. First of all, the nature of the randomness in her
brain and the steps that she takes to deal with it may be private information,
in which case predators would be unable to know even the contents of St
with certainty. Even if the nature of her neural randomness were common
knowledge, its regular effects would make it impossible for a predator to know
with certainty beforehand which action A∗t Mary would perform at time t.
A predator could still, in theory, predict Mary’s action A∗t with sufficient
confidence that it could exploit her, and her chosen action would thereby be
eliminated from St on a regular basis. Thus, PFW would be possible, but
not trivial, in such a world.
On the other hand, suppose the world is deterministic. If all agents have
bounded capacities of perception and reasoning, then determinism changes
nothing. To all agents, including predators, the world still appears indeter-
ministic. For Mary and PFW, the relevant level of apparent indeterminism
depends on both the complexity of the causal relationships underlying her
3If the randomness is replaced with pseudorandomness, this argument still works, but is
now more controversial; see Dennett, 2003, p. 81. The pseudorandom version is extraneous
to the problem at hand.
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behavior and the sophistication of the predators. If the predators are rel-
atively sophisticated compared to the complexity of Mary’s behavior, she
could be deterministic enough for them to exploit. Thus, for example, while
the protean flight path of the fly protects it from hungry birds, it is no de-
fense against a human capable of building a fly trap. Therefore, it is possible
that predators could preclude Mary’s PFW. If Mary’s world turns out to
be the Matrix, of the eponymous 1999 film, or the organic supercomputer
constructed by pandimensional beings, of Douglas Adams’ Hitchhiker novels,
then she does not, and could not, possess PFW.
The interesting case arises when Mary is among the most sophisticated
agents in her environment, and so is of similar sophistication to some of her
predators. Now Mary does not have to worry about superpredators, but
she cannot rely too much on private information, either. This situation in
particular calls for protean behavior. While Mary’s ultimate selection A∗t
may be totally determined by prior circumstances, all that matters is that
it not be determined or predicted by anything perceptible to her predators.
It may be sufficient, therefore, to select A∗t from St by some pseudorandom
process. The process must take place in finite time, say over the interval
τ := (t − , t), prior to the moment of action. Mary’s challenge, whether or
not determinism holds, is to ensure that any ‘noise’ generated during τ by
her choice process be uncorrelated with A∗t .
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6 Cloaking the Decision Process
I have shown that PFW is possible in both deterministic and indeterministic
worlds, and that in either case it requires a decision process which does not
hint at its outcome through the noise it generates. I will now consider the
interval τ during which this noise poses a meaningful risk. This is the period
just prior to an action during which that action has either been determined
or has been distinguished as significantly likely. It exists because Mary is a
human being, making decisions with a physical brain, which requires time
and space to make choices and plan motor actions. Protean free will turns
entirely on Mary’s ability to ‘cloak’ the process during τ so that nothing
perceptible to predators during this time is correlated with A∗t .
A population of individuals all trying to conceal their behavior from each
other, while trying to discern patterns in the behavior of others, will undergo
an intraspecific symmetric arms race (cf. Dawkins and Krebs, 1979). In
every generation, those individuals who are best at discerning the behavior
of others, as well as those with the best concealment strategies, will have a
selective advantage. As a result, the individuals who evolve over time will
have sharp intuitive psychology and very good poker faces. The former will
serve them when they are predators; the latter is what Mary needs for PFW.
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7 The Libet Experiments
The chief law governing health insurance administration and the related
privacy concerns in the United States, known as HIPAA, contains a ‘need
to know’ provision for information about patients’ health and healthcare.
Within the massive bureaucracy of a contemporary American hospital, the
only things a given staff member should know about a patient are those things
which that staff member needs to know to do her job. This dictum exerts a
profound influence upon the healthcare industry, in the way that documents
are written, the way software is designed, and the way administrative workers
do their jobs. Could Mary’s brain implement a similar policy?
In his experiments in the 1980’s, Benjamin Libet found that the ‘readi-
ness potential,’ a scalp potential visible on an EEG prior to a motor action,
preceded conscious awareness of certain actions by about 200 milliseconds
(Libet et al., 1983). Libet himself claimed that his findings impose con-
straints on free will (Libet, 1999). However, his findings could also indicate a
need-to-know policy operating in the brain. Indeed, the readiness potential
not only poses no threat to PFW, but actually supports it. Suppose Mary
has a demonstrated readiness potential.
Whether or not consciousness has privileged access to preferences, the
readiness potential need not say anything about the process of approximating
St. Once this set is defined, Mary is genuinely indifferent between its various
elements. If she could tell you, at some point after she had defined St but
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before she had selected A∗t , what she most wanted to do at time t, she would
say, “do one of the things in St without anybody else knowing what it’s
going to be.” This is her choice, as much as it might be her choice to do
some specific action Br at time r. For her to be free to make this choice, she
does not need to consciously know ahead of time which A∗t she will actually
end up performing.
Again, Mary is human, and things in her brain take time. Even after
selecting an action, it takes time to translate that imagined action into a
motor plan and enact it. Everything in her brain is connected, and these
processes will generate some amount of noise. However, she should have
evolved to keep this noise to a minimum. This will likely include keeping
it away, as much as possible, from the great amplifier of consciousness. For
Mary, the Libet experiments show a crafty tool nature has evolved to guard
her PFW.
8 Is PFW Compatibilist?
Protean free will is broadly compatibilist in that in is compatible with both
determinism and indeterminism. It is more rarefied than the ‘commonsense’
semicompatibilism of John Martin Fischer (Fischer, 2006). Nonetheless,
PFW meets his various criteria for free will, which all center around ‘our
phenomenology as agents’ (Fischer, 2007, p. 72). For Mary, the sensation
of defining St and selecting A
∗
t will be some form of the familiar process of
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considering alternatives and making a choice. To her conscious experience,
her ultimate choice may not seem random. This may make it seem all the
more ‘hers,’ helping her to take responsibility for it and to learn from her
actions. Thus, a protean-free action will feel as free as anything.
For the compatibilist Daniel Dennett, free will is tied not only to moral
responsibility, but also to reasons (Dennett, 2003, esp. Ch. 9). For Dennett,
a free agent ought to be able to offer up reasons for any past action when
called upon to do so. Were Dennett’s Inquisitor to observe Mary doing A∗t ,
and ask her why she had done so, Mary would have no shortage of reasons
to offer. How, though, is the Inquisitor to differentiate between reasons for
the inclusion of A∗t in St, and reasons for its ultimate selection? He may
not be able to tell! Thus, the sort of accountability to others which Dennett
emphasizes need not undermine Mary’s PFW. The Inquisitor does not ask
Mary what other actions she had equally good reasons for at time t, and
even if he did, Mary might not be able to answer. Cloaking the decision
process may mean that some possibilities, which were real possibilities for
her at some point prior to t, never entered her conscious awareness. Even
if she were to tell the Inquisitor everything she knows about how her mind
works and what she plans to do in the future, she might still then beat him
in Rock-Paper-Scissors.
PFW could also be a consolation prize for incompatibilists. For the hard
incompatibilist Derk Pereboom, moral responsibility is the point of free will,
which requires ‘robust’ alternative possibilities (Pereboom, 2001, p. 26).
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As described above, PFW can satisfy the requirements of such responsibil-
ity, provided that the people (or whatever) who hold Mary responsible for
her actions may be viewed as predators. This explains why Pereboom can
make a perfectly coherent argument for hard incompatibilism to a Christain
audience, as in Pereboom (2005), while his God-free presentation of hard
incompatibilism in Four Views (Pereboom, 2007) seems to be a quagmire of
question begging.
Likewise, the incompatibilist Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument
(van Inwagen, 1983, p. 16) requires a God’s-eye-view to do any work. For
even if our actions are uniquely and entirely caused by the past and the laws
of nature, no mortal being who is affected by our actions could possibly care
that this is the case. Van Inwagen literally invokes a God’s-eye-view when
he argues for the incompatibility of free will and indeterminism:
Now let us suppose that God a thousand times caused the uni-
verse to revert to exactly the state it was in at t1 (and let us
suppose that we are somehow suitably placed, metaphysically
speaking, to observe the whole sequence of “replays”). (van In-
wagen, 2000, p.14)
Should van Inwagen desire something akin to free will which requires no
metaphysical heroics, he might find PFW a suitable alternative.
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9 Concluding Thoughts
I have presented a notion of free will with a different emphasis from that of
most philosophers who have written on the subject. Protean free will is not
mutually exclusive, nor even necessarily different, from other notions of free
will. My original intent was to look directly at the role which other agents
play in the definition of free will, a role which I found underrepresented in
the current literature. In order to make an evolutionary argument, I focused
on agents with competing interests, which I called predators. Inspired by the
work of the evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller (1997), I chose to focus
on protean behavior as a defense against such predators. The resulting form
of free will turns out to be something which most people probably possess,
but not trivially so, and which satisfies many of the requirements posited by
philosophers of various stripes.
Furthermore, the importance of PFW in strategic interactions suggests an
evolutionary basis for the grip which issues of free will have held on so many
minds. Centuries ago, believers in a highly anthropomorphized God thought
of God the way they thought of other humans, which included worrying
about God knowing what they were going to next. While few contemporary
theologians take the issue seriously, the same worries have been taken up by
quite a number of contemporary philosophers.
Thus, many of the philosophical problems currently associated with free
will arise when philosophers reject (or ignore) the notion of a personal God,
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but retain some of the attendant baggage. Without God, others foreseeing
and thwarting one’s actions is a practical problem, not a metaphysical one.
Without God, moral responsibility is indistinguishable from moral account-
ability, and there is no coherent sense in which this can require libertarian
free will. Without God, free will offers little to nothing that protean free will
does not.
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